Journal #4 Answer the following question with only the sources given APA style 350 words All sources must be used and cited How is the liberal internatio

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Answer the following question with only the sources given APA style 350 words

All sources must be used and cited

How is the liberal international order expected to change (or changed) in the 21st century? Why maintaining the international liberal order can be considered a global issue? As you answer this question keep in mind Gordon Brown’s talk on the need for global good. do ?p=GRGM&u=mia.

Will the liberal order survive? The history of an idea
Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
Foreign Affairs. 96.1 (January-February 2017): p10+.
Copyright: COPYRIGHT 2017 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

Full Text:

During the nineteenth century, the United States played a minor role in the global balance of
power. The country did not maintain a large standing army, and as late as the 1870s, the U.S.
Navy was smaller than the navy of Chile. Americans had no problems using force to acquire
land or resources (as Mexico and the Native American nations could attest), but for the most
part, both the U.S. government and the American public opposed significant involvement in
international affairs outside the Western Hemisphere.

A flirtation with imperialism at the end of the century drew U.S. attention outward, as did the
growing U.S. role in the world economy, paving the way for President Woodrow Wilson to take
the United States into World War I. But the costs of the war and the failure of Wilson’s ambitious
attempt to reform international politics afterward turned U.S. attention inward once again during
the 1920s and 1930s, leading to the strange situation of an increasingly great power holding
itself aloof from an increasingly turbulent world.

Like their counterparts elsewhere, U.S. policymakers sought to advance their country’s national
interests, usually in straightforward, narrowly defined ways. They saw international politics and
economics as an intense competition among states constantly jockeying for position and
advantage. When the Great Depression hit, therefore, U.S. officials, like others, raced to protect
their domestic economy as quickly and fully as possible, adopting beggar-thy-neighbor tariffs
and deepening the crisis in the process. And a few years later, when aggressive dictatorships
emerged and threatened peace, they and their counterparts in Europe and elsewhere did
something similar in the security sphere, trying to ignore the growing dangers, pass the buck, or
defer conflict through appeasement.

By this point, the United States had become the world’s strongest power, but it saw no value in
devoting resources or attention to providing global public goods such as an open economy or
international security. There was no U.S.-led liberal order in the 1930s, and the result was a “low
dishonest decade,” in the words of W. H. Auden, of depression, tyranny, war, and genocide.

With their countries drawn into the conflagration despite their efforts to avoid it, Western officials
spent the first half of the 1940s trying to defeat the Axis powers while working to construct a
different and better world for afterward. Rather than continue to see economic and security
issues as solely national concerns, they now sought to cooperate with one another, devising a
rules-based system that in theory would allow like-minded nations to enjoy peace and prosperity
in common.

The liberal international order that emerged after 1945 was a loose array of multilateral
institutions in which the United States provided global public goods such as freer trade and
freedom of the seas and weaker states were given institutional access to the exercise of U.S.
power. The Bretton Woods institutions were set up while the war was still in progress. When
other countries proved too poor or weak to fend for themselves afterward, the Truman

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administration decided to break with U.S. tradition and make open-ended alliances, provide
substantial aid to other countries, and deploy U.S. military forces abroad. Washington gave the
United Kingdom a major loan in 1946, took responsibility for supporting pro-Western
governments in Greece and Turkey in 1947, invested heavily in European recovery with the
Marshall Plan in 1948, created nato in 1949, led a military coalition to protect South Korea from
invasion in 1950, and signed a new security treaty with Japan in 1960.

These and other actions both bolstered the order and contained Soviet power. As the American
diplomat George Kennan and others noted, there were five crucial areas of industrial
productivity and strength in the postwar world: the United States, the Soviet Union, the United
Kingdom, continental Europe, and Northeast Asia. To protect itself and prevent a third world war,
Washington chose to isolate the Soviet Union and bind itself tightly to the other three, and U.S.
troops remain in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere to this day. And within this framework, global
economic, social, and ecological interdependence grew. By 1970, economic globalization had
recovered to the level it had reached before being disrupted by World War I in 1914.

The mythology that has grown up around the order can be exaggerated. Washington may have
displayed a general preference for democracy and openness, but it frequently supported
dictators or made cynical self-interested moves along the way. In its first decades, the postwar
system was largely limited to a group of like-minded states centered on the Atlantic littoral; it did
not include many large countries such as China, India, and the Soviet bloc states, and it did not
always have benign effects on nonmembers. In global military terms, the United States was not
hegemonic, because the Soviet Union balanced U.S. power. And even when its power was
greatest, Washington could not prevent the “loss” of China, the partition of Germany and Berlin,
a draw in Korea, Soviet suppression of insurrections within its own bloc, the creation and
survival of a communist regime in Cuba, and failure in Vietnam.

Americans have had bitter debates and partisan differences over military interventions and other
foreign policy issues over the years, and they have often grumbled about paying for the defense
of other rich countries. Still, the demonstrable success of the order in helping secure and
stabilize the world over the past seven decades has led to a strong consensus that defending,
deepening, and extending this system has been and continues to be the central task of U.S.
foreign policy.

Until now, that is–for recently, the desirability and sustainability of the order have been called
into question as never before. Some critics, such as U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, have
argued that the costs of maintaining the order outweigh its benefits and that Washington would
be better off handling its interactions with other countries on a case-by-case transactional basis,
making sure it “wins” rather than “loses” on each deal or commitment. Others claim that the
foundations of the order are eroding because of a long-term global power transition involving the
dramatic rise of Asian economies such as China and India. And still others see it as threatened
by a broader diffusion of power from governments to nonstate actors thanks to ongoing changes
in politics, society, and technology. The order, in short, is facing its greatest challenges in
generations. Can it survive, and will it?


Public goods are benefits that apply to everyone and are denied to no one. At the national level,
governments provide many of these to their citizens: safety for people and property, economic

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infrastructure, a clean environment. In the absence of international government, global public
goods–a clean climate or financial stability or freedom of the seas–have sometimes been
provided by coalitions led by the largest power, which benefits the most from these goods and
can afford to pay for them. When the strongest powers fail to appreciate this dynamic, global
public goods are under-produced and everybody suffers.

Some observers see the main threat to the current liberal order coming from the rapid rise of a
China that does not always appear to appreciate that great power carries with it great
responsibilities. They worry that China is about to pass the United States in power and that
when it does, it will not uphold the current order because it views it as an external imposition
reflecting others’ interests more than its own. This concern is misguided, however, for two
reasons: because China is unlikely to surpass the United States in power anytime soon and
because it understands and appreciates the order more than is commonly realized.

Contrary to the current conventional wisdom, China is not about to replace the United States as
the world’s dominant country. Power involves the ability to get what you want from others, and it
can involve payment, coercion, or attraction. China’s economy has grown dramatically in recent
decades, but it is still only 61 percent of the size of the U.S. economy, and its rate of growth is
slowing. And even if China does surpass the United States in total economic size some decades
from now, economic might is just part of the geopolitical equation. According to the International
Institute for Strategic Studies, the United States spends four times as much on its military as
does China, and although Chinese capabilities have been increasing in recent years, serious
observers think that China will not be able to exclude the United States from the western Pacific,
much less exercise global military hegemony. And as for soft power, the ability to attract others,
a recent index published by Portland, a London consultancy, ranks the United States first and
China 28th. And as China tries to catch up, the United States will not be standing still. It has
favorable demographics, increasingly cheap energy, and the world’s leading universities and
technology companies.

Moreover, China benefits from and appreciates the existing international order more than it
sometimes acknowledges. It is one of only five countries with a veto in the UN Security Council
and has gained from liberal economic institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (where
it accepts dispute-settlement judgments that go against it) and the International Monetary Fund
(where its voting rights have increased and it fills an important deputy director position). China is
now the second-largest funder of UN peacekeeping forces and has participated in UN programs
related to Ebola and climate change. In 2015, Beijing joined with Washington in developing new
norms for dealing with climate change and conflicts in cyberspace. On balance, China has tried
not to overthrow the current order but rather to increase its influence within it.

The order will inevitably look somewhat different as the twenty-first century progresses. China,
India, and other economies will continue to grow, and the U.S. share of the world economy will
drop. But no other country, including China, is poised to displace the United States from its
dominant position. Even so, the order may still be threatened by a general diffusion of power
away from governments toward nonstate actors. The information revolution is putting a number
of transnational issues, such as financial stability, climate change, terrorism, pandemics, and
cybersecurity, on the global agenda at the same time as it is weakening the ability of all
governments to respond.

Complexity is growing, and world politics will soon not be the sole province of governments.

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Individuals and private organizations–from corporations and nongovernmental organizations to
terrorists and social movements–are being empowered, and informal networks will undercut the
monopoly on power of traditional bureaucracies. Governments will continue to possess power
and resources, but the stage on which they play will become ever more crowded, and they will
have less ability to direct the action.

Even if the United States remains the largest power, accordingly, it will not be able to achieve
many of its international goals acting alone. For example, international financial stability is vital
to the prosperity of Americans, but the United States needs the cooperation of others to ensure
it. Global climate change and rising sea levels will affect the quality of life, but Americans cannot
manage these problems by themselves. And in a world where borders are becoming more
porous, letting in everything from drugs to infectious diseases to terrorism, nations must use soft
power to develop networks and build institutions to address shared threats and challenges.

Washington can provide some important global public goods largely by itself. The U.S. Navy is
crucial when it comes to policing the law of the seas and defending freedom of navigation, and
the U.S. Federal Reserve undergirds international financial stability by serving as a lender of last
resort. On the new transnational issues, however, success will require the cooperation of
others–and thus empowering others can help the United States accomplish its own goals. In
this sense, power becomes a positive-sum game: one needs to think of not just the United
States’ power over others but also the power to solve problems that the United States can
acquire by working with others. In such a world, the ability to connect with others becomes a
major source of power, and here, too, the United States leads the pack. The United States
comes first in the Lowy Institute’s ranking of nations by number of embassies, consulates, and
missions. It has some 60 treaty allies, and The Economist estimates that nearly 100 of the 150
largest countries lean toward it, while only 21 lean against it.

Increasingly, however, the openness that enables the United States to build networks, maintain
institutions, and sustain alliances is itself under siege. This is why the most important challenge
to the provision of world order in the twenty-first century comes not from without but from within.


Even if the United States continues to possess more military, economic, and soft-power
resources than any other country, it may choose not to use those resources to provide public
goods for the international system at large. It did so during the interwar years, after all, and in
the wake of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, a 2013 poll found that 52 percent of Americans
believed that “the U.S. should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get
along the best they can on their own.”

The 2016 presidential election was marked by populist reactions to globalization and trade
agreements in both major parties, and the liberal international order is a project of just the sort of
cosmopolitan elites whom populists see as the enemy. The roots of populist reactions are both
economic and cultural. Areas that have lost jobs to foreign competition appear to have tended to
support Trump, but so did older white males who have lost status with the rise in power of other
demographic groups. The U.S. Census Bureau projects that in less than three decades, whites
will no longer be a racial majority in the United States, precipitating the anxiety and fear that
contributed to Trump’s appeal, and such trends suggest that populist passions will outlast
Trump’s campaign.

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It has become almost conventional wisdom to argue that the populist surge in the United States,
Europe, and elsewhere marks the beginning of the end of the contemporary era of globalization
and that turbulence may follow in its wake, as happened after the end of an earlier period of
globalization a century ago. But circumstances are so different today that the analogy doesn’t
hold up. There are so many buffers against turbulence now, at both the domestic and the
international level, that a descent into economic and geopolitical chaos, as in the 1930s, is not in
the cards. Discontent and frustration are likely to continue, and the election of Trump and the
British vote to leave the EU demonstrate that populist reactions are common to many Western
democracies. Policy elites who want to support globalization and an open economy will clearly
need to pay more attention to economic inequality, help those disrupted by change, and
stimulate broad-based economic growth.

It would be a mistake to read too much about long-term trends in U.S. public opinion from the
heated rhetoric of the recent election. The prospects for elaborate trade agreements such as the
Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership have
suffered, but there is not likely to be a reversion to protectionism on the scale of the 1930s. A
June 2016 poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, for example, found that 65 percent of
Americans thought that globalization was mostly good for the United States, despite concerns
about a loss of jobs. And campaign rhetoric notwithstanding, in a 2015 Pew survey, 51 percent
of respondents said that immigrants strengthened the country.

Nor will the United States lose the ability to afford to sustain the order. Washington currently
spends less than four percent of its GDP on defense and foreign affairs. That is less than half
the share that it spent at the height of the Cold War. Alliances are not significant economic
burdens, and in some cases, such as that of Japan, it is cheaper to station troops overseas than
at home. The problem is not guns versus butter but guns versus butter versus taxes. Because of
a desire to avoid raising taxes or further increasing the national debt, the U.S. national security
budget is currently locked in a zero-sum trade-off with domestic expenditures on education,
infrastructure, and research and development. Politics, not absolute economic constraints, will
determine how much is spent on what.

The disappointing track record of recent U.S. military interventions has also undermined
domestic support for an engaged global role. In an age of transnational terrorism and refugee
crises, keeping aloof from all intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries is neither
possible nor desirable. But regions such as the Middle East are likely to experience turmoil for
decades, and Washington will need to be more careful about the tasks it takes on. Invasion and
occupation breed resentment and opposition, which in turn raise the costs of intervention while
lowering the odds of success, further undermining public support for an engaged foreign policy.

Political fragmentation and demagoguery, finally, pose yet another challenge to the United
States’ ability to provide responsible international leadership, and the 2016 election revealed
just how fragmented the American electorate is. The U.S. Senate, for example, has failed to
ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, despite the fact that the country is relying on it
to help protect freedom of navigation in the South China Sea against Chinese provocations.
Congress failed for five years to fulfill an important U.S. commitment to support the reallocation
of International Monetary Fund quotas from Europe to China, even though it would have cost
almost nothing to do so. Congress has passed laws violating the international legal principle of
sovereign immunity, a principle that protects not just foreign governments but also American
diplomatic and military personnel abroad. And domestic resistance to putting a price on carbon

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emissions makes it hard for the United States to lead the fight against climate change.

The United States will remain the world’s leading military power for decades to come, and
military force will remain an important component of U.S. power. A rising China and a declining
Russia frighten their neighbors, and U.S. security guarantees in Asia and Europe provide critical
reassurance for the stability that underlies the prosperity of the liberal order. Markets depend on
a framework of security, and maintaining alliances is an important source of influence for the
United States.

At the same time, military force is a blunt instrument unsuited to dealing with many situations.
Trying to control the domestic politics of nationalist foreign populations is a recipe for failure, and
force has little to offer in addressing issues such as climate change, financial stability, or Internet
governance. Maintaining networks, working with other countries and international institutions,
and helping establish norms to deal with new transnational issues are crucial. It is a mistake to
equate globalization with trade agreements. Even if economic globalization were to slow,
technology is creating ecological, political, and social globalization that will all require
cooperative responses.

Leadership is not the same as domination, and Washington’s role in helping stabilize the world
and underwrite its continued progress may be even more important now than ever. Americans
and others may not notice the security and prosperity that the liberal order provides until they
are gone–but by then, it may be too late.

JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., is University Distinguished Service Professor at the Harvard Kennedy
School of Government and the author of Is the American Century Over?

Source Citation (MLA 8th Edition)
Nye, Joseph S., Jr. “Will the liberal order survive? The history of an idea.” Foreign Affairs, Jan.-

Feb. 2017, p. 10+. General Reference Center GOLD,
/A477642108/GRGM?u=miam11506&sid=GRGM&xid=60e5ee78. Accessed 17 June 2019.

Gale Document Number: GALE|A477642108

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